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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of rumours on markets. We consider a large population of
agents who participate in a two-good exchange economy. Agents communicate with their
local neighbors which gives rise to the possible spread of a rumour within the population.
Since the rumour may affect preferences, the evolution of the rumour has a direct impact
on economic variables, such as market demand and market equilibrium prices. If the
rumour dies out (long-run) equilibrium prices correspond to fundamental values, while
prices differ from fundamentals if the rumour stays present. When rumour effects are
strong the market crashes, in the sense that trade breaks down as the ratio of relative
prices converges to zero.
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“Fama, ... mobilitate viget virisque adquirit eundo,
... tam ficti pravique tenax quam nuntia veri.”
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— Vergil, Aeneis, IV.
1 Introduction
Rumours are part of our everyday life. They belong to human attributes since human beings
are part of the first society. Sometimes rumours contain confidential information about public
figures, in other cases they have hot news concerning important public topics. Rumours can
shape the public opinion of a society by affecting and coordinating the individual beliefs of its
members.
In consequence rumours may sometimes have a surprising impact also on the existing po-
litical system of a society. An example is the political situation in France in the mid 18th
century. (Cf. Farge and Revel (1988).) There, the authorities in Paris tried to keep all beggars
and vagabonds from the streets. In connection with this also a large number of children were
arrested. Immediately, rumours were going round, telling all different kinds of stories. While
some of them were quite plausible, saying, e.g., that the children were shipped to the colonies
in North America, soon others appeared that said that the children were used for medical ex-
periments, or even that Louis XV was taking a bath in the children’s blood. In any case, the
result was that the police was no longer able to carry out its original job, i.e. the purge of
Paris. The long-run consequences concerning the political system are well-known.
Rumours are also part of economic life. Consider, for instance, financial markets, where
traders are highly influenced by news on almost any kind of economic data, unemployment rates,
interest rates, growth rates, etc.. At the same time, also industry or firm specific information
can have clear effects on respective stock prices. In consequence, every little bit of information
is extremely important since it may lead to comparative advantages over other traders. A
perfect breeding-ground for rumours.
Other economic examples can be found in relation with consumption goods. Kapferer (1989)
presents a rumour that has been spread over Europe for more then ten years. Transmitted via
leaflets the rumour accused ten well-known brands of food products of being toxic and producing
cancer. Among the brands were such as Coca Cola, Martini, and Schweppes. Consumers were
told to boycott these products since they contained additives that despite being authorized
would be toxic or carcinogenic. Interestingly enough, one of these “dangerous” additives was
nothing else than harmless citric acid, which was named by its code name E 330.
1Roughly translated: The rumour, ... is strong through mobility and gains power through its spread, ... is
both seeking deception and a messenger of truth.
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Although rumours are well-known in economic life they are almost absent in economic
theory. Only in recent years some authors have started to look at rumours in economics,
both from a theoretical and from an empirical point of view. (For an empirical analysis of
rumours, see, e.g., the articles of Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) and Zivney et al. (1996), who
investigate the effect of takeover rumours on the evolution of stock prices. Recent theoretic
work is, e.g., Banerjee (1993).) The reason for this is intuitive. While economic theory has
always concentrated on rational behavior of individuals, rumours seem to be something very
irrational. In some sense, they do not fit into the model. Moreover, the rumour, in principle,
appears to be a phenomenon that is hard to capture.
The aim of this paper is to bring together standard microeconomic theory with the intuitive
idea of market participants that are influenced by rumours. Our main contribution is to give a
theoretical framework for the spread of a rumour through word-of-mouth communication and,
to study the effects on market prices when the rumour is present.
The early beginning of a scientific analysis of rumours goes back to the end of World War II,
where in the U.S. researchers began to focus on sociological issues of rumours. See e.g. Allport
and Postman (1946), Knapp (1944), and Peterson and Gist (1951).2 Since then people have
often expressed the idea that the typical and almost defining characteristic of a rumour is that
the information which is spread by the rumour is actually false. Therefore, a rumour has often
been considered as something that has to be fought. However, as Kapferer (1987) correctly
concludes, this idea leads to a logical problem. Why should people ever believe in a rumour if
it is well-known and obvious that any information that is spread by rumour will be false? And
why should then there be any need for the officials of a country or a company to fight against
rumours, since it should be clear that the population has no reason to believe in rumours? Isn’t
rather the contrary true, that people believe in rumours because sometimes they turn out to be
true? That sometimes they contain unknown secrets which would never be told by any official
media?
The important characteristic of a rumour is not the fact whether it is true or false. Rather
it is crucial that it is not possible to tell whether it is true or not. The reason is that a rumour
can be both truth and deception. We say therefore that a rumour is a piece of information
that is passed from one person to the other, generally through word-of-mouth communication,
without knowing exactly whether the information is true or not.3
Different rumours have common dynamics. The important mechanism is often the same.
Imagine somebody who is hearing an inofficial news for the first time. Because he cannot
2See Kapferer (1987). I refer to the german translation (1996).
3Perhaps a bit different is the situation where the rumour is obviously about something that is completely
unrealistic. Then, still the typical characteristics can apply when the basis of reality on which the information
is generally founded is replaced by the beauty of the story itself: “Se non e vero, e bene trovato!” (Giordano
Bruno).
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tell whether the news is true, he may both believe it or not. In general, this will depend on
his personal attitude towards unknown information, whether he is rather credulous or more
doubtful. However, if he hears the story again, this time told by some other person, he may
begin to believe that perhaps at least something in it must be true. And if the story is
communicated again and again, the likelihood for the rumour to be true seems to be increasing.
Thousand voices cannot be mistaken. Thus, the more people know the rumour, the more often
one can hear the rumour, and the more likely it is to believe the rumour. This again implies
that the more likely one may become also a source of the rumour, which eventually increases
again the number of people that get to hear the rumour. So on and so forth. The typical
dynamics of a rumour include some kind of recruitment or infection mechanism leading to the
fact that once a rumour is sufficiently known it can become self-enforcing. This mechanism will
be an important element of the model we discuss in this paper.
Infection dynamics, mainly analyzed in epidemiologic theory, are also part of the economic
model that is discussed in Banerjee (1993). There, the author models an agent’s decision to
believe in the rumour and to pass it on as an individual optimization decision. Precisely,
Banerjee uses an individual Bayesian updating approach to obtain a stochastic process that
describes the evolution of the rumour in time. The dynamics are then approximated through
a system of differential equations that are known from the epidemiological literature. Results
are obtained from an analysis of the approximating deterministic system.
In this paper we take a simplifying step and model the rumour transmission procedure as
a purely mechanical act. This allows us to analyze the resulting stochastic process directly. In
particular, we do not need any approximation technique in order to obtain results that con-
cern the evolution of the rumour within the population. Moreover, we restrict communication
between agents to local (social) neighborhoods, rather than allowing for global communication
as it is done in Banerjee (1993). We believe that this captures in a more intuitive way the
transmission dynamics of a rumour.
Other models that are similar in spirit focussing on interaction through word-of-mouth com-
munication or recruitment mechanisms include Ellison and Fudenberg (1995), Kirman (1993),
Banerjee (1992), and Bikhchandani et al. (1992). The main difference, however, lies in the un-
derlying question that is posed. While the above literature mainly concentrates on the problem
of social learning and efficiency: “How does a society of interacting agents aggregate individ-
ual information, thereby leading to inefficient or efficient outcomes?”, our main question is on
the economic effects of word-of-mouth communication as a special kind of interaction with-
in markets: “How do economic variables such as demand and equilibrium prices get affected
when preferences of individual agents are a product of rumour-like communication?” With this
respect, the work of Kirman (1993) is, perhaps, most closely related.
Mathematically, this paper is very much inspired by the attempt to use recent theoretical
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concepts from statistical mechanics in order to model the relation between a large number
of agents who interact on the so-called micro-level and possible resulting structures on the
so-called macro-level. The main technical tools come from the theory of interacting particle
systems. (See Liggett (1985) for an outstanding introduction into this field.) In fact, some
of the ideas we present have also been addressed in work of Föllmer (1974) about random
economies. There, the author studies the existence and quality of equilibria in economies
where individual preferences of agents are both random and depend on the local environment
of agents. Our approach coincides with this analysis in the sense that we also consider random
preferences with distributions that are conditional on the state of the local neighborhood of
an agent. However, our study differs from the one of Föllmer in two main ways. First, we
explicitly consider a dynamic framework that models the evolution of preferences within time.
Equilibria are stationary distributions of the underlying stochastic process. Second, we regard
economic agents not as simple statistical objects (the economic counterpart of the molecul in
physics), but as individuals who at the same time both are influenced from interaction, here
communication, with neighbors and behave individually rational given their conception of the
world. The latter is the standard assumption in most of economic theory. The first is, perhaps,
more common within sociological work about our human society.
The paper is organized as follows. We start presenting the basic set-up to analyze the spread
of a rumour within a population of traders, or consumers, who act within a two-good exchange
economy (Sections 2 and 3). Section 4 discusses the assumptions made on the transmission
of the rumour which determines the stochastic evolution of the rumour in time. Convergence
from arbitrary initial distributions is characterized in Section 5. Section 6 studies the notion
of individual and aggregated demand and defines market equilibrium prices for the random
economy. In particular we study the impacts on long-run equilibrium prices. Results show
that if the rumour dies out long-run equilibrium prices correspond to fundamental values of the
economy. However, if the rumour stays present, prices are different from fundamental ones if
and only if the rumour affects individual preferences. Notably, when these effects are strong the
market may crash, in the sense that trade breaks down as the ratio of relative prices converges
to zero. The final Section 7 concludes with a discussion.
2 Structure of the economy
Consider the following economy. There is a countable infinite set of economic agents. These
are the market participants, i.e. traders or consumers that act within the same market. We
consider exactly one market, which is modelled as a two-good exchange economy.
We assume that agents are located on the one-dimensional integer line Z and identify each
agent with his or her location. Typically, agents will be denoted by x, y, z ∈ Z. We assume
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furthermore that the economy is endowed with a neighborhood structure that looks as follows.
For any agent x ∈ Z, N(x) = {x − 1, x + 1} is said to be the set of (social) neigbors of
agent x. So neighbors are exactly those two agents who are located directly next to an agent,
either on the left-hand or on the right-hand side of that agent. Notice that this neighborhood
structure has three important features. First, the neighborhood structure is symmetric, i.e.
every agent is an element of the neighborhood of each of his neighbors. Second, it is local,
i.e. every agent is socially connected not to the whole rest of the economy but only to a finite
subset of other agents. Third, neighborhoods have a considerable overlap, i.e. every agent in
the economy shares each of his neighbors with another agent who himself is not an element of
his neighborhood. Or, to put it differently, every agent is the neighbor of two non-neighboring
agents.4
We think of neighborhoods as exclusive places of communication. Hence, the model assumes
that every agent communicates both directly with two other agents, namely his neighbors, and
indirectly, through the channel of overlapping neighborhoods also with the rest of the economy.
This assumption seems intuitive for situations of word-of-mouth communication that we have
in mind. Rumour-like information often comes to us in a way where one neighbor tells us a
story like: “Hey, I ’ve got a neighbor who has a neighbor who again has a neighbor who ... who
has heard that ...!”
We want to analyze a two-good exchange economy where agents additionally interact trough
communication of a rumour. Within such an economy, at any time every agent is completely
characterized by his endowment (portfolio), his preference, and the fact whether he knows the
rumour, or not. This is modelled by the function
σt : Z → IR
2
+ × P × {0, 1}
x 7→ σt(x) = (ωt(x),t(x), ηt(x)). (1)
The index t captures time, which we model to be continuous, so t ∈ IR+0 . We say that σt(x)
gives the state of agent x at time t. The first coordinate gives the agents vector of endowments
of the two available goods in the economy, ωt(x) = (ωt1(x), ωt2(x)). The second coordinate
identifies the preference over vectors of goods, which we assume to be an element of the set of
all admissible preferences, denoted by P . For the moment, we leave this set unspecified. It will
be defined in the next section. The last coordinate is crucial. It determines whether an agent
knows the rumour, or not. If ηt(x) = 1 this stands for the fact that at time t agent x knows
the rumour, while ηt(x) = 0 means that at this time agent x does not know the rumour.
For any t ≥ 0, σt represents the state of the whole population at time t. We say that σt
gives the current configuration. Let X := {σ|σ : Z → IR2+ × P × {0, 1}} denote the space of
4For example, agents x and x+2 both have agent x+1 as a neighbor but at the same time are no neighbors
themselves.
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all possible configurations, thus σt ∈ X for any t ≥ 0. Denote Γ := {η| η : Z → {0, 1}} the
space of all projections of configurations σ onto the last coordinate, describing the distribution
of knowledge of the rumour within the economy. An element η ∈ Γ is called a rumour pattern.
3 Rumours and preferences
Rumours affect preferences. There exists a link between knowledge of the rumour on the one
hand and preferences over commodity bundles on the other. Recall, e.g., the example discussed
in Kapferer (1989), where the rumour accused specific brands of food products of being toxic
and producing cancer. In this case, the informative element of the rumour affects preferences
directly. Even great fans of a specific product will cease to consume that product once they
believe it to be toxic or to produce cancer.5 Take sugar and saccherine as an example. Once
people believe that saccherine produces cancer, they may easily switch consumption to sugar.
Weighing some pounds more, obviously, appears to be less dangerous that facing the risk of
cancer. In financial markets, takeover rumours are a prominent example for a link between the
rumour and the preferences of market participants. The rumour can affect preferences, e.g.,
when the takeover is seen as a signal for the value of the firm that is to be taken over. For more
information about this issue confirm the articles of Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) and Zivney
et al. (1996).
Rumours may also affect preferences indirectly. As in the example of the vanishing children
of Paris, the rumour may concern a topic that is only indirectly related to preferences. While
the information of the rumour directly addresses only the possible whereabout of the children
it indirectly affects the preference of the people towards the authorities. Economic examples
of indirect effects are rumours on macroeconomic data, as unemployment, interest rates, or
growth rates.
In any case, whether it is direct or indirect, the effect of a rumour on preferences lies at
hand. People that know the rumour can be expected to have different preferences than before.
Still, the precise mechanism between rumours and preferences does not seem to be completely
understood, yet. This appears to be an open research topic, especially for psychologists and
sociologists. However, since in this paper, we are interested not in the mechanism itself but
rather in the economic impacts of such rumour-preference effects, we take a pragmatic position
and model these effects in a very simple way. Our assumptions are the following.
Corresponding to the fact that there are exactly two goods available in the economy, we
assume that there are two different basic opinions: one is in favor of good 1, the other is in
favor of good 2. Depending on which opinion applies an agent chooses only that specific good
5A usual reply is that people smoke. However, that situation is different, because all cigarettes are toxic and
produce cancer. Thus, at least the absence of a non-toxic substitute in this case is a special element that may
keep people from quitting smoking.
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and ignores the other. However, the opinion may change and therefore corresponding behavior
is variable instead of being deterministic. Precisely, we assume that with probability θ an agent
shares the first opinion and demands only good 1, with probability 1 − θ the agent shares the
second opinion and demands only good 2, where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. Thus, we assume preferences to
be random.
Formally, such a random preference looks as follows:
θ=
{
1 with prob. θ
2 with prob. 1− θ,
(2)
where 1 and 2 represent the basic opinions, i.e. for any ω, ω′ ∈ IR
2
+, ω 1 ω
′ iff ω1 ≥ ω′1 and
ω 2 ω′ iff ω2 ≥ ω′2. The set of admissible preferences is the set of all random preferences of
this type,
P := {θ | 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1}. (3)
Remark: As we will see in section 6, the expected demand function of an agent with
random preference θ∈ P is identical to the demand function obtained from a Cobb-Douglas
preference with parameter θ. Thus, the average behavior of an agent in our model meets
classical assumptions of economic theory. (Cf. also Hildenbrand (1971).)
In order to model the relation between knowledge of the rumour and preferences, we assume
that there exists a preference θ̄∈ P , which we call the fundamental preference, that describes
the opinion of participants in the market, before the rumour is introduced. That is, one can
think of the situation as being such that there is a share of agents equal to θ̄ who take the
first opinion and prefer good 1 over good 2 and a share of agents equal to 1− θ̄ who take the
opposite position. Thus, the general opinion of the market as a whole can be expressed by the
value θ̄. Formally, we model this in the way that every agent has the same random preference
θ̄, if there is no rumour present yet.
Once the rumour is introduced at say, t = t0, it affects preferences of those agents that know
the rumour. In our model, at any time t ≥ t0 this is the set of agents
{x ∈ Z | ηt(x) = 1}. (4)
We assume that preferences change through a change in its parameter from the value θ̄ to
some (other) value θ∗, where θ∗ ∈ [0, 1]. (This includes the situation where preferences stay the
same, i.e. θ∗ = θ̄.) Thus after the rumour has been introduced the preference of the population
can be described as follows. For agent x at time t ≥ t0,
t(x) =
{
θ̄ if ηt(x) = 0
θ
∗
if ηt(x) = 1.
(5)
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Those agents that do not know the rumour, have the fundamental preference θ̄, while all




∈ P . We hereby assume that
the change in preferences is the same for every agent in the economy.
Notice, that these assumptions allow for all rumour-preference effects that have been de-
scribed above. Within our set-up a specific rumour is completely determined by the pair of
parameters (θ̄, θ∗). For example, if θ∗ > θ̄ this corresponds to a situation where the rumour is
negative about good 2, thus the probability of prefering good 1 over good 2 increases. If θ∗ < θ̄,
it is the other way round. Moreover, the difference between θ̄ and θ∗ can be seen as a measure
of the degree of the effect. If the difference is large, the effect is strong, while if the difference
is small, the corresponding effect is weak. The effect is at its extreme in the case where, e.g.,
θ̄ = 0 and θ∗ = 1. In this case the rumour produces a complete preference reversal.
4 Communication of the rumour
Having defined the general structure of the economy and the relation between rumours and
preferences, we focus in this section on the transmission dynamics of the rumour. In particular,
we make assumptions on the communication of the rumour within a given neighborhood. Since
the rumour is transmitted via communication within distinct but overlapping neighborhoods,
these assumptions will then determine the dynamics of the rumour itself.
First, every agent who knows the rumour directly communicates it only to his two neighbors.
This is in line with the idea mentioned above that neighborhoods are the exclusive places of
direct communication between agents.
In consequence and second, the probability for an agent, who does not know the rumour,
to get to know the rumour is zero if none of his two neighbors knows the rumour.
Third, the probability to get to know the rumour, to “believe it” and in consequence to
communicate it is strictly greater than zero if at least one neighbor knows the rumour. More-
over, this probability is increasing with the number of neighbors that know the rumour. This
assumption is motivated by the idea that people are strongly influenced by majorities. Every
neighbor who knows and communicates the rumour increases the subjective probability of an
agent that the rumour must be true. If I hear a story once, I can believe it or not, but if I hear
it also from a second person there must at least be something in it that is true.
Fourth, agents can forget the rumour. Due to other objects that may appear in everyday
communication the importance or relevance of a rumour may decrease. In consequence, agents
that have heard the rumour may stop thinking of it and forget about it after a while. The
probability to forget the rumour is constant and independent from the state of neighbors. The
intuition is that imperfect recall comes from individual bounded rationality rather than from
non-existing communication between neighbors. In particular, the fact that neighbors confirm
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the rumour has no influence on forgetting.
Fifth, communication does not depend on the first two elements of agents’ states, i.e. en-
dowments and preferences. Of course, people also have preferences on talking about different
rumours. Some rumours are more likely to be communicated than others. However, since we
assume that preferences in our model concern only preferences over commodity bundles, these
should be independent from the attitude towards communicating the rumour itself. In other
words, we do not model the preferences that capture the talk about the rumour itself as part of
the preference relations in P . It is done through assumptions on the communication directly.6
Formally, we model the transmission of the rumour as a continuous-time Markov process.
This is done by defining so-called flip rates c(x, σt), where x ∈ Z and σt ∈ X. They determine
the probability that given a configuration σt agent x changes his rumour-specific state in such
a way that for small s ↓ 0 it holds that
P [ηt+s(x) 6= ηt(x)] = c(x, σt) · s+ o(s). (6)
The following definition of flip rates captures the five assumptions made above.





ηt(y) if ηt(x) = 0
1 if ηt(x) = 1,
(7)
where λ is some constant, λ ≥ 0.
Notice first that, in accordance to assumption five, flip rates depend only on the projection
of σt onto its third coordinate, i.e. ηt. Moreover, they also depend only on the restriction of the
configuration to the neighborhood of an agent. This corresponds to the first assumption. The
second assumption relates to the fact that for ηt(x) = 0, c(x, σt) = 0 if and only if ηt(y) = 0 for
every y ∈ N(x). Assumption three concerns the part of the definition that holds for ηt(x) = 0:
c(x, σt) is increasing with every neighbor y such that ηt(y) = 1. The fourth assumption is
obviously captured in the part of the definition that holds for ηt(x) = 1.
In this model the parameter λ is constant and exogenous. It determines the degree of social
interaction and communication between neighbors. In this sense, it also captures the preference
of agents to talk about the rumour, as described in assumption five. If λ = 0, this implies that
there is no communication between neighbors, a situation we shall not be interested in during
the following. If λ > 0, the value directly determines the probability for an agent who does
6Notice that assumption five is not in contradiction with the assumption made before that rumours affect
preferences over commodity bundles.
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not know the rumour yet to get himself infected by talking to one of his neighbors. As we
can see from equation (7), the higher the value of λ the higher this probability is. Thus, λ
measures also the social closeness between neighbors. Another interpretation is that λ is related
to the relevance of the rumour. High values correspond to a great importance of the rumour to
individual agents. This idea is clearly connected to the first one, since hot issues are generally
communicated more intensively.
The fact that the rate for forgetting the rumour is exactly equal to one is simply due to
normalization and has no qualitative effects on the results. It rather allows us to control the
relation between the probability to forget the rumour and the probability to get infected by
the rumour via the single parameter λ.
Following standard theory on interacting particle systems, flip rates as in Definition 4.1
define a unique continuous time Markov process {σt}t≥0 on the state space of all possible
configurations X. Since the dynamics of the process follow those of the well-known contact
process, results concerning the evolution of the rumour follow from general results on spin
systems and from specific results on the contact process (Liggett (1985)).
5 Evolution of the rumour
In this section we focus on the evolution of the rumour itself, i.e. the (projected) process
{ηt}t≥0. Let M denote the set of probability measures on the space Γ = {η| η : Z → {0, 1}},
provided with the topology of weak convergence. We assume that the rumour is introduced
at time t = 0 in the way that the inital pattern is described by some probability distribution
µ ∈ M. The objective is therefore to characterize convergence of the process ηt for arbitrary
initial distributions.
The first observation is the following. For any parameter value λ the Dirac-measure ν0 := δ∅,
i.e. the measure that puts total mass on the rumour pattern η ≡ 0, signifying that nobody in
the economy knows the rumour, is an invariant distribution for the rumour.7 This means that
once nobody in the economy knows the rumour the rumour will be gone for ever in the future.
There is no spontaneous source for the rumour except (possibly) at the beginning.
The second and crucial observation is that — in spite of its simplicity — the rumour exhibits
a phase transition.8 This means that there exists a critical value λ∗ such that for any λ < λ∗, ν0
7Note that there exists a one to one correspondence between the space Γ and ∆ = {T | T ⊂ Z} via the
mapping χ : Γ → ∆, χ(η) := {x| η(x) = 1}. Thus, for any set T , the Dirac-measure δT puts probability one
on the rumour pattern, where exactly all agents x ∈ T know the rumour and nobody else.
8The phenomenon of phase transitions has already been studied in other economic applications. See, e.g.,
Föllmer (1974) for an early economic analysis of phase transitions in the situation of a random exchange
economy. Other examples include Allen (1982) and Durlauf (1993). Allen investigates the effects of innovation
in an economy that is described by a Markov random field. Durlauf works in a growth-theoretic context. He
uses the random field approach in order to describe the possible dynamics of an economic take-off as an effect
10
is the unique invariant distribution and also the unique limiting distribution, independent on
initial conditions. In this case the rumour will always disappear. However, for any λ > λ∗, the
set of invariant measures is equal to the convex set that is spanned by the extreme measures
ν0 and νλ, where the latter is the limiting distribution obtained from starting with the intitial
pattern η ≡ 1. Hence, λ∗ is the critical value where the ergodicity of the rumour breaks
down. Obviously, the interesting case — also from an economic point of view — is the second
nonergodic one.
The following proposition characterizes the possibilities for the stochastic evolution of the
rumour in both the ergodic and the nonergodic case. Proofs are given in the appendix. The
subsequent definition then explains what we mean by saying, the rumour disappears, or, the
rumour stays persistently present.
Proposition 5.1 There exists a critical value λ∗ such that ∀λ < λ∗, ν0 is the unique invariant
and limiting distribution for the rumour. If λ > λ∗, the set of invariant distributions is equal
to the nondegenerate convex set
I = {ν | ν = αν0 + (1− α)νλ, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1}. (8)




where µt denotes the distribution of the rumour at time t when µ0 = δZ is the Dirac-measure
that puts full mass on the pattern η ≡ 1.
Results of Liggett (1985) put an upper bound of 2 on the value of λ∗. This indicates already
that the nonergodic regime is not only the more interesting one but, if we allow λ to take any
finite value, is also the one that is more likely. For λ > λ∗ , the two distributions ν0 and νλ are
orthogonal (see the proof of Proposition 5.1), i.e. in particular νλ(η ≡ 0) = 0. Therefore, νλ
ensures that with probability one at least some agent in the economy knows the rumour. Hence,
convergence to the distribution νλ corresponds to saying that the rumour will be persistently
present in the economy, while convergence to the distribution ν0 corresponds to saying that the
rumour disappears.
of impulses coming from leading technologies in an economy. For a short and rather informal introduction into
the economic sense of phase transitions see also Hors (1995).
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Definition 5.2 For given λ let µt be the distribution of the rumour at time t, starting with
initial distribution µ ∈M. Thus, in particular µ0 = µ. The rumour disappears if
lim
t→∞




µt(η ≡ 0) = 1. (11)
If λ > λ∗, the rumour is persistently present if
lim
t→∞
µt = νλ. (12)
In this case it follows that
lim
t→∞









for any x ∈ Z.
Passing from the ergodic to the nonergodic regime the evolution of the process undergoes an
abrupt change. While in the first regime it is sure that the rumour will disappear for any initial
distribution, in the second regime the evolution of the process is much more ambiguous. Since
the set of invariant distributions I is no longer a singleton but the whole “interval” between
ν0 and νλ, in principle any measure ν ∈ I is a candidate for the limiting distribution of the
process starting with some initial distribution µ. Proposition 5.4 clarifies this convergence for
arbitrary initial distributions. A special class of initial distributions for which convergence can
be determined very easily is the class of translation invariant distributions.
Definition 5.3 A probability measure µ ∈ M is translation invariant if for any
(x1, . . . , xk), xj ∈ Z, any values (i1, . . . , ik), ij ∈ {0, 1}, and any z ∈ Z
µ
(




η(x1) = i1, . . . , η(xk) = ik
)
, (15)
i.e. probabilities do not depend on z.
Denote τ the stopping time for the rumour to enter the state η ≡ 0. Let P µ denote the
probability measure on the canonical path space of the rumour starting with initial distribution
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µ.9
Proposition 5.4 Consider the case where λ > λ∗. Let µ ∈ M be any arbitrary initial distri-
bution (µ0 = µ). Then
ν = lim
t→∞
µt = αν0 + (1− α)νλ, (16)
where
α = P µ[τ <∞]. (17)
Thus, α equals the probability for the rumour to disappear in finite time. If µ is translation
invariant,
α = µ(η ≡ 0). (18)
For translation invariant distributions the value of α that determines the mixture between
ν0 and νλ is explicitly given by the probability for the initial pattern to be η ≡ 0, signifying that
nobody in the economy hears the rumour at the beginning. Once we can ensure this probability
to be zero we obtain weak convergence to the distribution νλ, thus we know that the rumour
will be persistently present in the economy for any time in the future. At the same time we
see that the rumour dies out if and only if µ(η ≡ 0) = 1, i.e. at the beginning there is simply
nobody who knows the rumour.
This result has a nice consequence. Assume that at the beginning everybody in the economy
has the same chance to hear the rumour. In order to model this, consider the initial distribution
to be determined as follows. A random process assigns to each agent independently the value
0 or 1. Let this process be binomially distributed with parameter ε. Hence, µ is the Bernoulli




= ε, for every agent x ∈ Z. In other words, at the beginning
everybody hears the rumour with the same probability ε. In this situation µ(η ≡ 0) = 0 if and
only if ε > 0. Thus, if we know that the probability for every agent in the economy to hear
the rumour is strictly positive, we can conclude that in consequence the rumour will never die
out but will be persistently present, even if ε is arbitrarily small. Only if ε = 0 the rumour will
(trivially) die out since it will not even be known at the beginning.
The assumption for µ to be translation invariant can be very restrictive. As we have just
seen, this can mean that everybody has in fact the same access to relevant information, an
9In general a continuous time Markov process with state space Γ is given by a collection of probability
measures {P η}η∈Γ on the canonical path space of the process. Each P η determines the stochastic evolution of






assumption that can perhaps be hard to be argued in many economic situations. However,
since in general condition (17) applies, it is possible to specify the value of α for every initial
distribution. Particularly, also for Dirac-distributions δη, with η being some arbitrary pattern.
The next proposition determines the value of α in this case.
Proposition 5.5 If the initial distribution is µ = δη, with η ∈ Γ being some pattern,
P δη[τ <∞] = 0 ⇔ η contains infinitely many agents that know the rumour, (19)
⇔ |{x | η(x) = 1}| =∞. (20)
Thus, in this case, the only requirement for the rumour to be persistently present is that
the set of agents that get to know the rumour at the very beginning is infinitely large, while it
is irrelevant how dense the set is. The final corollary summarizes.
Corollary 5.6 Suppose λ > λ∗. Given any initial distribution µ, the rumour will be persis-
tently present if and only if ∫
X
P η[τ <∞] µ(dη) = 0. (21)
If µ is translation invariant this condition reduces to
µ(∅) = 0. (22)
If µ = δη the condition reduces to η containing infinitely many agents that know the rumour.
6 Market equilibrium prices
In the previous section we have seen that the evolution of the rumour is nonergodic if the
parameter λ that measures the intensity of communication between neighbors is sufficiently
large. This nonergodicity has an immediate consequence on economic variables as market
demand and market equilibrium prices.
Assume, for the moment, the state of the economy to be given by some concrete configuration
σ. Thus, we freeze dynamics and analyze the economy from a static viewpoint. Since preferences
are random, denote ζ(σ(x), p) the expected excess demand function of agent x, given his state
σ(x) and some price vector p = (p1, p2). In view of our assumptions on the set of admissible
preferences, we can write expected excess demand as follows.









where, θ = θ̄ if η(x) = 0, and θ = θ∗ if η(x) = 1. As explained in section 3, θ̄ determines the
fundamental preference of agents that do not know the rumour, while θ∗ identifies the change
in preferences for those agents that know the rumour.
Note that for any random preference θ, expected excess demand equals just the excess
demand of an agent with Cobb-Douglas utility function u(ω) = ωθ1ω
1−θ
2 . On average, an agent
spends θ of his wealth on good 1 and 1− θ on good 2.
In our model a rumour shapes the population of market participants in a stochastic manner.
Thus, we have to analyze the market as a random environment which is distributed according to
some probability measure on the space of configurations X. What is an appropriate equilibrium
condition for a market equilibirum price vector in such a random economy? Föllmer (1974)
studies the notion of equilibrium prices in an economy that is modelled as a random field.
Since our economy can be seen as a dynamic analogon to this approach, we may consider his
definition of a market equilibrium price.
Let ρ be a probability measure on the space X, that describes the random configuration σ
of the economy.
Definition 6.1 A price vector p is a market equilibrium price vector for the economy that







ζ(σ(x), p) = (0, 0), ρ− a.s. (25)
where Bn = {−n/2, . . . , n/2} and n even.
Market equilibrium prices are prices where per capita excess demand is zero, ρ-a.s..
Let us now reconsider the dynamic set-up. From Definition 6.1 we know that for any time
t, a market equilibrium price vector pt for the economy that at time t is described by the







ζ(σ(x), pt) = (0, 0). ρt − a.s. (26)
Be µt the marginal distribution of ρt, describing the distribution of the rumour within the
economy. From section 5 we know that, taking the limit t→∞, the distribution µt converges
to an invariant distribution of the rumour. If λ < λ∗, the unique invariant distribution is ν0.
The rumour always disappears. If λ > λ∗, the rumour stays persistently present for a large class
of initial distributions, i.e. we obtain limt→∞ µt = νλ. Moreover, convergence to equilibrium ν0
if λ < λ∗, and to νλ if λ > λ∗, can be shown to be exponentially rapid (cf. Liggett (1985)).
Hence, both of these limiting distributions may serve as an approximation for the distribution
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of the rumour when t is large, that is when the rumour has been around in the population for
a sufficient amount of time. We use this approximation in order to calculate so-called long-run
equilibrium prices.
Up to now we have not made any restricting assumptions on individual endowments of
agents. However, in order to be able to calculate equilibrium prices, at this point we have
to make the assumption that, at least in the long run, all agents have the same endowment
ω(x) ≡ ω. In consequence, for any fixed parameter pair (θ̄, θ∗) with corresponding preferences
of agents, the spaces X and Γ are isomorph. Hence probability measures ρ on X and µ on Γ
are equivalent and we can apply Definition 6.1 directly to distributions µ, i.e. in particular to
ν0 and νλ.








ζ(σ(x), p) = Eν [ ζ(σ(0), p) ], ν − a.s. (27)
with 0 denoting the agent that is located at the origin. This follows from ergodic theory since
both measures are translation invariant and also extreme within the set of translation invariant
measures (cf. Liggett (1985)). Thus, in a sense we are in a situation where the agent at location
zero is in fact a representative agent for the economy. Note, however, that this relation breaks
down as soon as we consider any other invariant distribution for the rumour, that is a real
mixture of both extreme measures ν0 and νλ. In that case we are left alone with equation (25)
again.
In consequence, applying Definition 6.1 to distributions ν ∈ {ν0, νλ}, the condition for
long-run equilibrium prices reduces to a much simpler one.
Definition 6.2 A price vector p is a long-run equilibrium price vector for the distribution
ν ∈ {ν0, νλ} if the following condition holds,
Eν [ ζ(σ(0), p) ] = (0, 0). (28)












The next proposition gives the condition for long-run equilibrium prices assuming endow-
ments to be strictly positive.
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Proposition 6.3 Assuming ω1, ω2 > 0 and (θ̄, θ∗) 6= (0, 0), long-run equilibrium prices are









For a price vector to constitute a long-run equilibrium price vector, the ratio of individual
prices has to equal the ratio of endowments times weigthed shares of different opinions in the
market, where weights equal the probability for the representative agent to know the rumour
or not.
We start analyzing the situation when the rumour disappears, (ν = ν0).
If the long-run distribution equals ν0, all terms involving θ∗ in equation (31) disappear,
since ν0(0) = 1 and ν0(1) = 0. Hence, the unique long-run equilibrium price is the fundamental









If the rumour stays persistently present (ν = νλ), the situation looks different. In this case,
from equation (31) we obtain a unique long-run equilibrium price vector p(λ) which differs from
the fundamental price vector if and only if θ∗ differs from θ̄, thus iff the rumour has any effect
on preferences.
Assume θ∗ > θ̄, hence the rumour is negative about good 2; the probability for preferring















Thus, also the relative price of good 1 increases with respect to the fundamental one. By
the same argument, the relevant price of good 2 increases when the rumour is negative about
good 1, (θ∗ < θ̄).
Assume we increase the parameter λ (keeping other parameters fixed), signifying the degree
of communication to become stronger. The interpretation is that either, people discuss new
information more extensively, or the rumour is about a more relevant or more important issue.
However, of course, no interpretation has to exclude the other.

























The latter can be seen as convergence to the rumour price, in contrast to the fundamental
price above. Intensifying the communication increases the probability for agents to eventually
believe in the rumour, thereby shifting preferences from fundamental values to rumour values
which, finally, increases the demand in the good that is “preferred” by the rumour.
Before we conclude, imagine a situation where the rumour effects are strong, i.e. the pa-
rameter θ∗ differs sufficiently from the fundamental equivalent θ̄. Without loss of generality,
consider the situation to be such that 0 < θ̄ < 1
2
while θ∗ ≈ 1. Before appearance of the rumour
the general opinion in the market is slightly in favour of good 2, while all agents that know
the rumour tend to prefer good 1 with a high probability. In order to make it clear, assume
that agents knowing the rumour prefer good 1 over good 2 with probability one, i.e. θ∗ = 1.
From equation (36) we see immediately that, if we increase the communication parameter λ to






Since the intensity of communication of the rumour has no limit the probability for agents
to eventually believe in the rumour increases to one. Consequently, because of the effects on
preferences, this leads to an infinite increase of demand in the good that is “preferred” by the
rumour, letting the relative price of that good increase to infinity and/or the relative price of
the other good decrease down to zero. In other words, the market crashes! While the economy
was stable before appearance of the rumour, in the sense that there exists a unique vector
of relative prices that clears the market, trade eventually breaks down when the rumour is
spreading through the population.
7 Discussion
The analysis in this paper has focused on rumours as an information transmission procedure
between agents that act in a two-good exchange economy. The aim has been to look for
reasonable dynamics that model the evolution of a rumour and that can be used to answer
questions concerning the impact of rumours on economic issues, such as market demand and,
especially, long-run equilibrium prices. Results have shown that if the rumour disappears, long-
run equilibrium prices correspond to fundamental values of the economy. If the rumour stays
present, which happens for a large class of initial distributions, long-run prices are different
from fundamental ones if and only if the rumour affects individual preferences. In particular,
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when these effects are strong relative prices may differ from corresponding fundamentals by an
infinite degree, leading to a crash of the market.
Still, there are a lot of issues that have to be addressed in order to obtain a true under-
standing of the relation between rumours and markets. One important object is certainly the
parameter λ that determines the probability for uninformed agents to get to know the rumour
from neighbors. While in this model λ was modelled exogenously, an obvious extension is to
endogenize that parameter and derive it from other variables. With this respect, a crucial
variable will be the (subjective) value of the information that is transmitted. This again could
be linked to prices of some commodities or expected returns of an investment opportunity,
depending on the situation one wants to analyze.
In any case, future models will have to link the rumour and the economic process not just
via a mechanical act but via true decision procedures undertaken by the individual agents.
Here, Banerjee (1993) represents a promising attempt, using a Bayesian updating approach.
Other ideas may come from information theory, decision theory, or game theory.
Due to technical difficulty we have not yet been able to calculate equilibrium prices for an
economy that is described by a distribution different from ν0 and νλ, although the generality
of our model allows for a definition of such a price. In particular, our main results concern the
effects on long-run equilibrium prices where agents do not trade before dust in the economy
settles down. Although this approach serves as an approximation for the general situation, a
richer model will connect the rumour with trading behavior more directly. Then, it will be
interesting not only to look for impacts of the rumour on trade but also vice versa. It seems
to be quite obvious that trading may have direct implications on the evolution of a rumour, if
the rumour itself affetcs some of the related economic issues.
An interesting additional topic is to build an economic theory of the rumour itself. Such
a theory shall regard the rumour as an economic good that can be traded between agents.
Questions are then the following ones: How does a market of rumours look like? What is the
price of a rumour? Is there something like an equilibrium (price) for rumours? Clearly, answers
to these questions will be highly connected to the ones mentioned above. Therefore results in
this direction can also be very helpful in order to analyze questions as we have addressed in
this paper.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5.1: The first observation is that the rumour is attractive, i.e. flip rates
are such that every agent is more likely to flip if he generally “disagrees” with his neighborhood
than if he generally “agrees” with it. In this sense agents can be considered as attracting each
other. By Theorem 2.3, chapter III of Liggett (1985), this implies that the following limiting
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where S(t) denotes the semigroup of the rumour. Since we do not want to go to deeply into
the mathematics of interacting particle systems we refer to the book of Liggett (1985) to
get an understanding of the theory of semigroups and continuous time Markov processes. In
this context it will perhaps be sufficient to understand that for any initial distribution µ the
distribution of the rumour {ηµt }t≥0 at time t, here denoted as µt, is given by
µt = µS(t). (40)
Intuitively speaking, the semigroup is the continuous time analogue to the transition matrix of
a discrete time Markov process.
Both distributions are extreme points in the convex set of all invariant distributions, I.
Using another result from Liggett (Theorem 3.13, chapter III) it follows then that these two
measures are the only extreme points in this set, hence
I = {ν | ν = αν0 + (1− α)νλ, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1}. (41)
Liggett shows that this is generally true for every particle system on Z that fulfils the
conditions (i) attraction, (i) nearest neighbor interaction (flip rates depend only on the states
of neighbors, which are those that are located directly on the left-hand or on the right-hand
side), and the more technical one (iii) c(x, η) + c(x, ηx) > 0 whenever η(x − 1) 6= η(x + 1),
where ηx is defined as
ηx(z) :=
{
η(z) : z 6= x
1− η(z) : z = x.
(42)
Since the rumour meets even the condition that c(x, η) + c(x, ηx) ≥ 1 for any x and any η these
conditions are obviously fulfilled.







which does not depend on x since νλ is translation invariant. The situation where the two
measures coincide is then simply the one where ρ(λ) = 0. By a result of Liggett (Corollary
1.7, chapter III) it can be shown that ρ(λ) is a non-decreasing function of λ. Thus it suffices
to look for the critical value λ∗ as
λ∗ = inf{λ ≥ 0 | ρ(λ) > 0} (43)
= sup{λ ≥ 0 | ν0 = νλ}. (44)
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Clearly, this does not imply that λ∗ <∞. However, Liggett proves that 1.18 ≤ λ∗ ≤ 2. For
our purpose this is far enough and concludes the proof of Propositions 5.1. 2
Proof of Proposition 5.4: The claim for translation invariant distributions follows from the
general claim of the proposition. In order to see this, assume that µ is translation invariant.
In consequence, µ(η) = 0, for every η with |η| := |{x ∈ Z : η(x) = 1}| <∞. At the same time
|η| =∞ implies that
P η[τ =∞] = 1, (45)
which proves Proposition 5.5. This follows from self-duality of the rumour. By this it is
understood that for any η and any A ∈ Y := {T ⊂ Z : |T | <∞} the following holds:
P η[ηt ∩ A 6= ∅] = P
A[η ∩At 6= ∅], (46)
where At is the finite version of the rumour. (Recall the one to one correspondence between
spaces Γ and ∆ = {T | T ⊂ Z}, via the mapping χ : Γ→ ∆, χ(η) := {x| η(x) = 1}.) Thus, it
is particularly true that
P Z[ηt ∩A 6= ∅] = P
A[Z ∩At 6= ∅] (47)
= PA[At 6= ∅]. (48)
Taking the limit t ↑ ∞, this leads to
νλ
(
ηt(x) = 1 for some x ∈ A
)
= PA[τ =∞].
With |A| = n+ 1 implying PA[τ =∞] ≥ PBn[τ =∞], where Bn = {−n/2, . . . , n/2}, the claim
then follows from taking the limit n ↑ ∞ and the fact that νλ(∅) = 0. (Replace A by η.)
The general case is technically rather complex and fully given in Liggett (1985), chapter
VI, pp. 284-287. Therefore we omit a reproduction at this point. Just in order to mention the









for every η ∈ Y and f ∈ C(X), where C(X) is the set of real-valued bounded continuous
functions on X. This is done first in the case η = {0}, which is then used to proof the claim
for general η ∈ Y . 2
Proofs of Proposition 5.5 and Corollary 5.6: Proposition 5.5 has been proven in the proof of
Proposition 5.4. Corollary 5.6 is an immediate consequence of the results before.
Proof of Proposition 6.3: Recall the expression of expected excess demand given in equation
(24). Then























= (0, 0). (51)
Remember that ωi(x) ≡ ωi for every agent x ∈ Z, thus in particular for agent 0. Rearranging
this equation leads to equation (31), concluding the proof. 2
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